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1. Introduction 
Hopes that the end of the Cold War would facilitate the emergence of a “New World Order” 
“where the United Nations (…) is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders [and] 
freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations“1, soon proved to be 
premature. Although no longer split along East-West lines, the United Nations found itself 
unprepared to respond to the kind of “new wars”2 which erupted in Yugoslavia and Sub-
Saharan Africa and have been devastating entire regions ever since. Often connected with the 
disintegration of state structures, these wars have acquired notoriety for the suffering endured 
by civilians who are regularly targeted by armed groups, subjected to cruel treatment such as 
sexual violence, or who are deliberately displaced. The United Nations failed effectively to 
stop these attacks not only because of their often insufficient presence on the ground, but also 
because their troops more often than not lacked a clear mandate for what would seem their 
foremost duty – to protect civilians from attacks.  
It was only in the late 1990s, after the Rwandan genocide and the massacre of Srebrenica, that 
the United Nations began systematically to address the issue of civilian protection: The 
“Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts” became a separate item on the Security 
Council’s agenda and the task to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical danger” 
was increasingly included into peacekeeping mandates3. But have these developments made 
any difference on the ground? Have the United Nations succeeded in creating the “culture of 
protection”4 which the Secretary General called for and which the humanitarian community 
so enthusiastically endorsed? Considering the importance of the subject, these questions have 
attracted surprisingly little academic attention. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the 
effectiveness of UN peacekeeping forces in protecting civilians, the present paper is intended 
to close this gap.  
We will proceed in the following way. After a short outline of the history and conceptual 
basis of the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping, and a presentation of our 
methodology, we will first assess the effectiveness in protecting civilians of those UN 
peacekeeping missions which had or have a corresponding mandate. To this end, we will 
develop a standard for measuring effectiveness which takes into account the overall security 
situation created by the UN forces as well as specific measures and tactics they employ. We 
will then apply this standard to those UN operations which so far have been endowed with a 
   
1 Bush 1991.  
2 See Münkler 2002, Kaldor 2000. 
3 See S/2001/331 of 30 March 2001 and S/2005/740 of 28 November 2005. 
4 S/2001/331, §5. 
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mandate to protect civilians, namely the missions in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi. In the second part of the paper, we identify factors 
which may have influenced the effectiveness of the missions in protecting civilians. We will 
then go on to examine the relevance of these factors in our empirical cases and will identify 
those constellations of factors which can serve as a basis for explaining the success or failure 
of missions. Finally, we will critically evaluate our findings and spell out their implications 
for the future of civilian protection. 
 
2. The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations  
The engagement of international organisations in “peacekeeping” has a tradition dating back 
to the days of the League of Nations5. Since the Second World War under the aegis of the 
United Nations, the functions, forms and tools of peacekeeping have evolved in response to 
changing conflict patterns and political circumstances: from the consensus-based 
“interposition” forces typical of the Cold War era to multidimensional peace-building 
missions, from sporadic ventures into peace enforcement to full-fledged interim 
administrations, UN peacekeeping operations have assumed such varied combinations of 
tasks as to defy easy categorization. While some scholars have proposed to differentiate 
between four “generations” of peacekeeping, reflecting the expansion of tasks from 
“peacekeeping” and “peacebuilding” to “peace enforcement” and “state building”6, others 
choose the amount of enforcement as a criterion of differentiation7. In the context of this 
paper, however, only those peacekeeping missions are relevant which have been explicitly 
mandated to protect civilians and to use force to this purpose.  
In traditional or “first generation” peacekeeping, which mainly consisted in monitoring 
ceasefire or peace agreements, UN forces were only allowed to use force in self-defence. 
With the expansion of tasks, they were consecutively granted the right to “active self-
defence”, i.e. to use force in order to assert their right to freedom of movement, and even 
more extensive enforcement rights, which were needed for example to secure the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance8. It was not until October 22, 1999, however, that the Security 
Council for the first time authorized a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), to use force in order to “afford protection to civilians under 
   
5 See Bothe 2002, p. 664.  
6 Gareis/Varwick 2003, p. 124; this categorization is the most commonly accepted, not least within the United 
Nations itself.  
7 Debiel 2003, 221ff. 
8 See e.g. for Bosnia-Herzegovina: S/RES/761 of 29 June 1992, for Somalia: S/RES/794 of 03 December 1992.  
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imminent threat of physical violence”9. This authorization came only one month after the 
Security Council had adopted a first “programmatic” resolution on the “Protection of 
Civilians in Armed Conflict” in which it noted that “civilians account for the vast majority of 
casualties in armed conflicts and are increasingly targeted by combatants and armed 
elements”, strongly condemned the “deliberate targeting of civilians”, and expressed “its 
willingness to respond to such situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted 
[…], including through the consideration of appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”10.  
The Council also referred to the “relevant recommendations” of the Secretary General, who, 
in his first report on the subject, had argued that “in situations where the parties to the conflict 
commit systematic and widespread breaches of international humanitarian and human rights 
laws, causing threats of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Security 
Council should be prepared to intervene under Chapter VII of the Charter. The use of coercive 
action should be seen as a mechanism of last resort to protect the civilian population from 
immediate threats to their lives […]”11. By now, the “Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict” has become a firmly established item on the Security Council’s agenda12, and 
peacekeeping missions have been authorized to protect civilians, apart from Sierra Leone, in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi.  
The significance of this development – the Secretary General rightly calls the first resolutions 
on the subject a “milestone”13 – can only be fully appreciated in light of the more disturbing 
chapters of the United Nations’ peacekeeping record. To recall only the most appalling 
example: The United Nations Mission stationed in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide failed 
miserably to stop the slaughter not only for a lack of troops14, but also for its insufficient 
mandate, which allowed the use of force only in self-defence15. After Rwanda and Srebrenica 
   
9 S/RES/1270, OC 14. 
10 S/RES/1265, PC 4, OC 2 and 10.  
11 S/1999/957, §67; the President of the Security Council had requested the report in the Presidential Statement, 
specifying that the report should contain „concrete recommendations […] on ways the Council, acting within its 
sphere of responsibility, could improve the physical and legal protection of civilians in situations of armed 
conflict”. See S/PRST/1999/6.  
12 See the Security Council Resolutions, Presidential Statements and Reports by the Secretary General on the 
subject. The adoption of a new resolution is expected soon.  
13 S/2005/740, §2. 
14 See Melvern 2004. 
15 This included the protection of civilians who had taken refuge with the United Nations as well as the defence 
of “secure humanitarian areas” the establishment of which the Security Council mandated on May 17, when the 
genocide was already underway for more than seven weeks (!). See S/RES/918, OC 3; see also OC 4, where the 
Security Council “[r]ecognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or 
groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the 
means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief“. However, even this measure hardly had any effect for 
the lack of troops and equipment.  
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– Darfur threatens to become the next case on that list –, the failure to protect civilians has 
come, in the eyes of many, to epitomize incompetence and ineffectiveness on the part of the 
United Nations. But this is only one reason why the importance of the Security Council’s 
increasingly serious commitment to civilian protection can hardly be overestimated. 
The fact that the United Nations’ capability to protect civilians is regarded as a yardstick only 
reflects the more fundamental truism that “safeguarding their physical protection is […] the 
first concern civilians have in times of conflict”16.  
The task to protect civilians is of a different quality than other elements of peacekeeping 
mandates. Whereas the effectiveness and importance of measures like assistance in the 
implementation of ceasefire agreements or reconstruction can only be meaningfully assessed 
with reference to the overall success of a mission17, the protection of civilians constitutes a 
“goal in itself”, and the attainment of this goal is valuable regardless of other aspects of the 
mission. This makes the isolated analysis of just one aspect of UN missions – the 
effectiveness in protecting civilians – methodologically meaningful.  
 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
These relatively recent developments in the history of peacekeeping practices have generated 
an entirely new set of research questions. As already explained, our aim in this paper is, 
firstly, to assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians, and 
secondly, to identify those constellations of factors which can serve as a basis for explaining 
the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians. Thus, our research 
questions has two parts:  
(1.) Which UN peacekeeping missions have been effective in protecting civilians? 
(2.) Which constellations of factors explain the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping 
missions in protecting civilians; in other words, which are the causal conditions for 
the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians? 
To answer these questions, we will proceed as follows. In the “assessment part” of our 
research (part 4), we will first develop a standard for effectiveness. Then we will create “thick 
descriptions”, i.e. analytical narratives, of several empirical cases of UN peacekeeping 
missions, and finally we will assess their effectiveness in protecting civilians based on the 
previously developed standard, which will allow us to categorize them as 
effective/ineffective.  
   
16 S/2005/740, §37. 
17 Thus, it is almost cynical to point to UNAMIR’s instrumental role in restoring the telecommunications 
capabilities of Rwanda after ten percent of the population had been murdered before its eyes.  
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The “explanation part” of our research (part 5) is based on this categorization of the empirical 
cases as effective/ineffective. Here, we will first identify those factors (“causal conditions”) 
which we believe can explain the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping missions. 
We then go on to analyse which of these factors were present in our empirical cases. Finally, 
we apply a comparative method in order to highlight those constellations of factors which 
make peacekeeping missions effective in protecting civilians. We can thereby provide a “soft” 
causal explanation of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians.  
Our sample of empirical cases is based on a very clear selection criterion, the “mandate 
criterion: We analyse all those UN peacekeeping missions which had or still have a mandate 
to (1.) protect civilians under (2.) Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which means that they 
were/are allowed to use “all necessary means”, including military force, to fulfil their 
mandate. So far, the Security Council of the United Nations has given such a mandate to 
peacekeeping missions in five Sub-Saharan African countries, namely Sierra Leone, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi. In two of these countries, 
the Security Council changed the mandates of the peacekeeping missions during their 
deployment, in ways which were significant for the effectiveness of the missions. We will 
therefore analyse the missions in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo in two 
and three parts, respectively, and treat these parts as separate cases. The case studies are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1:  Case studies 
 
 UN Mission Security Council Resolution Country 
C1 UNAMSIL I. SC Resolution 1270 (1999) Sierra Leone 
C2 UNAMSIL II. SC Resolution 1313 (2000) Sierra Leone 
C3 MONUC I. SC Resolution 1291 (2000) Democratic Republic of Congo 
C4 Artemis/Ituri 
Brigade 
SC Resolution 1484 (2003)/ 
1493 (2003) 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
C5 MONUC II. SC Resolution 1565 (2004) Democratic Republic of Congo 
C6 UNMIL SC Resolution 1509 (2003) Liberia 
C7 UNOCI SC Resolution 1528 (2004) Côte d’Ivoire 
C8 ONUB SC Resolution 1545 (2004) Burundi 
 
The time frame of our analysis differs depending on the case study. It begins with the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution which authorizes the respective mission, and ends 
with the termination of the mandate, i.e. the mission’s withdrawal. In cases of ongoing 
missions the analysis extends to December 2005. 
For the data collection we rely on United Nations documents, such as Security Council 
resolutions, as well as the regular reports by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council 
on developments in the countries where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed. We also 
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consult reports issued by think tanks, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), and human 
rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW). The extent to which we can use 
scholarly literature varies. Regarding some of the case studies, especially UNAMSIL, there 
already exist a fair amount of literature; others, especially the most recent, have hardly been 
studied yet. In these cases, we have to rely on newspaper articles, in addition to the reports of 
the Secretary General, to get an adequate picture of the mission’s performance.  
 
4. Assessing the Effectiveness of UN Forces in the Protection of Civilians 
 
4.1. Developing a Standard for Effectiveness 
In order to assess the effectiveness of UN interventions we have decided to focus on two main 
indicators: 1) the control exercised by United Nations peacekeepers within the area of 
deployment, namely whether the mission was successful in shielding civilians from abuses; 2) 
the implementation of measures specifically designed to enhance the protection of civilians. 
The specification “within the area of deployment” is necessary to the assessment of a 
mission’s effectiveness since the protection of civilians – within the UN mandate – is usually 
limited to the mission’s territorial reach. Consequently, human rights violations occurring in 
parts of the country where UN peacekeepers have not been deployed are not directly relevant 
for the assessment of a mission’s effectiveness. Since the UN mandate specifies a restricted 
protection task, our first indicator refers to the level of control peacekeepers have achieved 
within their areas of deployment. By “control” we understand the prevention of human rights 
violations, such as systematic attacks, killings, rape, and torture. The second indicator, i.e. the 
implementation of measures for the protection of civilians, assesses whether the mission’s 
activities, such as patrols, cordon-and-search operations etc. have been successful in 
significantly reducing attacks on the civilian population. In the following case studies, 
analytic narratives have been provided which should ideally allow us to assess whether area 
control and successful measures have indeed reduced the number of civilian casualties. 
 
4.2. Case Studies 
 
4.2.1. Sierra Leone 
Background. The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), a rebel group, invaded the country from Liberia18. With the Sierra Leonean 
   
18 On the history of the conflict see Hirsch 2001 and Reno 2001. 
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government too weak to militarily defeat the rebels, they came to control large parts of the 
country, and in 1995 it was only with the help of Executive Outcomes, a private military 
company, that the Government managed to halt the rebels’ advance on Freetown, Sierra 
Leone’s capital. Meanwhile, in the areas under its control, the RUF engaged in the illegal 
exploitation of the country’s resources, especially diamonds, and committed unconscionable 
atrocities against the civilian population19. In 1999, Nigeria announced its intention to 
withdraw its troops from the over 10,000-strong ECOMOG20 peacekeeping force, which had 
been trying to protect the democratically elected Sierra Leonean president from coupes d’état 
and military defeat by the RUF since 1997. Since its military situation would become 
hopeless without Nigerian support, the Government was forced to negotiate a peace 
agreement with the RUF, the Lomé Agreement, which granted the RUF a blanket amnesty 
and substantial political power, including important cabinet posts. The imminent Nigerian 
withdrawal also inspired, at least, a sense of urgency in the West and at the United Nations, 
which had so far only maintained a small observer force (UNOMSIL) in the country. In 
addition, the Lomé Agreement specifically requested the United Nations to “authorize the 
deployment of a peace-keeping force in Sierra Leone”21. This paved the way for the 
establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).  
 
UNAMSIL I (1999-2001). With Resolution 1270, of October 22, 1999, the Security Council 
established UNAMSIL and authorized it to assist the parties to the Lomé Agreement in the 
implementation of the Agreement, in particular in the disarmament of the rebels and pro-
government paramilitary forces, and in the planned elections22. These tasks were typical for 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations and followed the “’standard’, sequential, UN 
recipe for ending civil wars and creating ‘self-sustaining’ peace”: a ceasefire or peace 
agreement (the Lomé Agreement), followed by disarmament and demobilisation, and 
elections23. What was new, however, was that for the first time in the history of UN 
peacekeeping, the Security Council endowed a UN peacekeeping mission with a Chapter VII 
mandate, i.e. a mandate to use all necessary means, including military force, to protect 
   
19 About 250,000 women and girls are estimated to have been subjected to sexual violence during the conflict. 
Sexual violence was thus even more widespread than the amputations of limbs for which the Sierra Leonean 
conflict became notorious. See HRW 2003, pp. 25f.  
20 ECOMOG = Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group. 
21 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra 
Leone, Lomé 03 June 1999, Article XXXIV. 
22 S/RES/1270, OC 8. 
23 Malan 2001.  
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civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence”24. In Resolution 1289, of February 7, 
2000, the Security Council expanded UNAMSIL’s tasks to, inter alia, providing security to 
“key locations” in Freetown, while it reaffirmed the mandate to protect civilians25. In 
addition, the Council authorized the expansion of UNAMSIL’s military component to 11,000 
troops, up from the 6,000 authorized in Resolution 1270.  
UNAMSIL had a disastrous start. In the first months of 2000, it was not clear who was 
actually disarming whom26: In January 2000, peacekeepers from Kenya and Guinea were the 
first to surrender their weapons and equipment, including armoured personnel carriers, 
without resistance after being ambushed by the RUF. In May 2000, the RUF even began to 
take peacekeepers hostage, capturing more than 500 soldiers and their equipment within 
several days27. Not only did the captured peacekeepers make no use of their right and mandate 
to defend themselves, many others also manifestly disobeyed orders by resisting to deploy 
into RUF-held areas and even giving up their position “at the mere rumour that the RUF was 
advancing”28. Not surprisingly, under these circumstances UNAMSIL did not protect any 
civilians. Although the gradual deployment of UNAMSIL into rebel-held territory reportedly 
had “a positive impact on reducing the incidence of human rights abuses”29, civilians 
continued to be murdered, raped and mutilated “practically under the noses of government 
and international troops”30. 
The obvious failure of UNAMSIL prompted a decisive response. The first priority was to 
reinforce the UNAMSIL presence in order to protect the civilian population in Freetown and 
in other government-controlled areas against the emboldened RUF31. On May 19, 2000, the 
Security Council further increased the authorized strength of what already was the largest UN 
peacekeeping operation at that time, to 13,00032. Of most immediate impact, however, was 
the arrival, on May 7, of several hundred British troops. Although officially operating 
independently of UNAMSIL and mandated only to provide safety to British nationals, the 
British were “to all intents and purposes running the day-to-day operations of UN forces”33: 
setting up roadblocks, securing the airport and patrolling Freetown as well as the most 
important highways.  
   
24 S/RES/1270, OC 14. 
25 S/RES/1289, OC 10, 11. 
26 Malan 2001.  
27 See Masland/Bartholet 2000a and 2000b. Cf. S/2000/455, §§56ff. 
28 Bullion 2001, p. 80.  
29 AI, 18 May 2000. 
30 HRW, 03 March 2000.  
31 S/2000/455, §83. 
32 S/RES/1299, OC 1. 
33 United Kingdom Defence Secretary Geoffrey Hoon, quoted in Malan 2001.  
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UNAMSIL II (2001-2005). After the May Crisis, the United Nations had to acknowledge that 
there was no peace to keep in Sierra Leone. Member States of the United Nations began to 
advocate a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for 
UNAMSIL34. Since the Secretary General cautioned not to give such a mandate until it could 
be matched by adequate capacity, it was only in August 2000 that the Security Council 
authorized UNAMSIL to  
“deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding 
robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force; [and to] deploy 
progressively […] in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main 
population centres and […] to assist, through its presence and within the framework of its 
mandate, the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extent state authority, restore law 
and order and further stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country 
[…]”35. 
This mandate changed the character of the mission. UNAMSIL was no longer allowed to use 
force only in self-defence, to ensure the freedom of movement of its personnel and to protect 
civilians, but was de facto authorized to fight the RUF in case the rebels put up any resistance 
to UNAMSIL’s deployment and the extension of state authority throughout the country.  
However, it took some time until UNAMSIL could translate this mandate into action. First, 
the mission had to undergo internal restructuring in order to enhance its effectiveness and 
remedy the shortcomings that had permitted “a rebel army of young thugs”36 to humiliate it. A 
“high-level multi-disciplinary assessment team” found “ a serious lack of cohesion” in the 
mission which expressed itself most tellingly in that there was “no shared understanding of 
the mandate and rules of engagement”37. In other words, parts of the troops were neither 
aware of the exact purpose of their mission nor of the means they were allowed to employ38. 
This problem was addressed through internal training programs and the distribution of pocket-
sized cards with information on the rules of engagement to the troops39. Another factor which 
delayed actions beyond securing the status quo was the withdrawal by India and Jordan of 
their contingents which accounted for 4,800 troops, i.e. almost half of UNAMSIL’s total 
strength at that time, and which could only slowly be replaced.  
   
34 S/2000/455, §100. 
35 S/RES/1313, OC 3. 
36 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003, p. 3. 
37 S/2000/751, §§53f. 
38 This, of course, goes a long way to explaining why they had been so reluctant to risk their lifes. 
39 S/2000/832, §41; S/2000/1055, §38. 
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In March 2001, UNAMSIL finally began to venture into RUF-held territory, where the 
civilian population continued to suffer from what the Secretary General euphemistically 
called the “harmful effects” of the RUF’s hold over the area40: summary executions, rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, amputations and mutilations. In accordance with a revised 
concept of operations, UNAMSIL first conducted “long-range robust patrols into RUF-
controlled areas”41 and later permanently deployed, in several stages, to key locations 
throughout the country, forcing the rebels to dismantle their military positions and disarm in 
the process. Backed up by an increase in troop strength from 9,750 in March 2001 to 16,700 
in March 2002, the deployment at times even proceeded more quickly than originally 
envisaged, and by January 11, 2002, all rebels had been disarmed42. UNAMSIL had 
established its presence throughout the country and began to focus on ensuring security for 
upcoming democratic elections43. UNAMSIL’s mandate terminated on December 31, 2005.  
 
Assessment. It has to be attributed to the British involvement that the ineptitude displayed by 
UNAMSIL in the first months of its deployment did not result in the disaster in terms of 
civilian protection which the fall of Freetown would have entailed. In early 1999 (before 
UNAMSIL was deployed), the RUF had nearly defeated the ECOMOG force in Freetown and 
had murdered about 6,000 civilians during its presence in the capital. This time, the rebels, 
which were advancing towards Freetown with the Armoured Personnel Carriers captured 
from UNAMSIL, could be stopped thanks to the British reinforcement. Although UNAMSIL, 
with British help, was able to ensure the safety of civilians in and around the capital during 
the following months, in has clearly been ineffective in protecting civilians on the scale 
envisaged by its mandate at least until March 2001, when it began to deploy into RUF-
controlled territory. Its rapid deployment throughout the country from then on, however, 
resulting in the complete disarmament of the RUF and thus the complete elimination of the 
main threat to the civilian population, made UNAMSIL at least effective in protecting 
civilians.  
  
4.2.2. Democratic Republic of Congo 
Background. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo had its beginning in August 
1998 when a rebellion erupted in the East of the country44. While the rebellion was backed by 
   
40 S/2000/832, §49.  
41 S/2001/228, §61; for the revised concept of operations, see ibid. §§57ff.  
42 S/2002/267, §2. 
43 Ibid. §10.  
44 See Lemarchand 1999.  
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Rwanda and Uganda, the Congo’s Eastern neighbours, several other African states rushed to 
the Congolese government’s help, which turned the conflict into Africa’s first “World War”45. 
That it also became its deadliest46 was, however, less due to the fighting than to massive 
internal displacement caused by ethnic cleansing, sexual violence and looting in which the 
state parties to the conflict as well as a myriad of armed groups engaged on a routine basis. In 
spite of a cease-fire agreement, the withdrawal of the foreign armies and the formation of a 
government of national unity, the conflict continues to this day, although with lower intensity.  
The involvement of the United Nations in the conflict began after the signing, on July 10th, 
1999, of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which requested the United Nations Security 
Council “to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peacekeeping force in the DRC to 
ensure implementation of this Agreement; and taking into account the peculiar situation of the 
DRC, mandate the peacekeeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC”47. Apart 
from a multitude of other tasks, the peacekeeping mission was supposed to be authorized to 
“provide and maintain humanitarian assistance to and protect displaced persons, refugees and 
other affected persons”48. The Agreement further demanded a Chapter VII mandate for the 
mission49, and envisioned its deployment within 120 days50.  
Although the UN Security Council had already expressed its willingness to assist in the 
implementation of a ceasefire agreement51, the initial response of the United Nations was 
cautious, and a far cry from the demands of the Lusaka Agreement. In his first report on the 
subject, the Secretary General noted that “in order to be effective, any United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, whatever its mandate, will have 
to be large and expensive [and] would require the deployment of thousands of international 
troops”52. He also warned of the complex challenges a peacekeeping mission in the Congo 
would have to deal with53. Due to these reservations, the United Nations Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in the beginning only consisted of liaison officers 
   
45 ICG, 20 December 2000, p. 87. 
46 In fact, the Congo War is the “deadliest recorded conflict since the Second World War”; see Hawkins 2003, p. 
47.  
47 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art.11.  
48 Ibid. Annex A, Chapter 8. 
49 Ibid. Art. 11. 
50 Ibid. Annex B.  
51 S/RES/1234, OC 15. 
52 S/1999/790, §15. According to some estimates, the pacification of the whole country would have required the 
deployment of 100 000 soldiers. See ICG, 20 August 1999, p. iv.  
53 S/1999/790, §15.  
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and military observers, who had the task to establish contact with the parties to the conflict 
and to explore the conditions for the deployment of a substantive peacekeeping force54.  
 
MONUC I (2000-2004). When the Secretary General requested an expansion of MONUC to 
more than 5,000 peacekeepers in January 2000, the liaison officers and military observers had 
not fulfilled their tasks. In fact, of the 90 liaison officers mandated in August 1999, only 7955, 
and of the 500 military observers mandated in November 1999, none had been deployed. As 
this was mainly due to a deteriorating security situation, the Secretary General asked for the 
additional troops primarily in order to allow MONUC to fulfil its original mandate56, not to 
assume any substantial additional tasks. In particular, he emphasized that the forces “would 
not have the capacity to protect the civilian population from armed attack”57. He also 
specifically warned that the deployment of a peacekeeping operation would “create inflated 
expectations that might well be unrealistic”58. 
Resolution 1291, which the Security Council adopted one month later, barely reflects these 
concerns. “Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations”, the Council 
decided that “MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its 
infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities […] to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence”59. Was MONUC effective in implementing this 
mandate?  
The time span covered by the Resolution 1291 and subsequent resolutions which, while 
authorizing some increases in troop strength, did not significantly alter the mandate’s content, 
can for analytical purposes be divided into three phases60: The first phase extends from the 
adoption of Resolution 1291 on February 24th, 2000, until the deployment of the first troops in 
summer 2001, the second phase covers the build-up of capacity until the Ituri Crisis in 
summer 2003, and the third phase encompasses the subsequent time period until the adoption 
of a new mandate in October 2004, the implementation of which will be analysed under the 
heading “MONUC II”.  
Phase I. It is safe to say that in phase I, MONUC had no effect on the situation of the civilian 
population which continued to deteriorate as a result of armed clashes, ethnic violence and 
   
54 The deployment of the liasison officers and military observers was authorized in S/RES/1258 of August 6, 
1999, and S/RES/1279 of November 30, 1999, by which MONUC was formally established.  
55 S/2000/30, §16. 
56 Ibid §62; cf. Hawkins 2003, p. 54, fn.11. 
57 S/2000/30, §67. 
58 Ibid. §85.  
59 S/RES/1291, OC 8. 
60 The division employed here is not congruent with the “phases” of MONUC deployment referred to in UN 
documents, as those relate to tasks of the mission, not necessarily time periods.  
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displacement61. In fact, the about 200 liaison officers and military observers the United 
Nations got on the ground during MONUC’s first year were dependent on the parties to the 
conflict and the local authorities for their security. In his reports to the Security Council from 
this period, the Secretary General makes no mention of MONUC’s mandate to protect 
civilians. The priority clearly was, at this time, to ensure the safety of MONUC’s own 
personnel. Nevertheless, the Secretary General was proven right in his warning that the 
deployment of MONUC with a mandate not matched by resources would create “unrealistic” 
expectations: After heavy fighting erupted in the city of Kisangani in the summer of 2000, 
protests were staged outside MONUC’s headquarters in Kinshasa, as the 20 military observers 
stationed in Kisangani had, for obvious reasons, not intervened62.  
Frustrated with non-cooperation by the parties, the Secretary General even threatened that the 
United Nations might abandon MONUC entirely. MONUC’s failure to even start the 
deployment of troops for more than one year, however, could not be blamed solely on the 
non-cooperation of the parties, the reluctance of UN member states to contribute troops to the 
mission, and the disastrous state of the Congo’s infrastructure: At a time when the Western 
powers had just conducted extensive bombing campaigns against Serbia and Iraq and had 
belatedly, but decisively intervened in East Timor, the Security Council’s approach to the DR 
Congo could well be considered “over-cautious in expecting standards not demanded in other 
areas”63.  
Faced with these realities, in February 2001 the Secretary General proposed an “updated 
concept of operations” which focused on the monitoring and verification of the parties’ 
compliance with the terms of the ceasefire and disengagement agreements64. The Secretary 
General envisaged a “gradual build-up of capability” to 3000 military personnel, but stressed 
that these would not be able “to extend protection to the local population”65. The Security 
Council endorsed the updated concept of operations in Resolution 1341 of February 22nd, 
200166. While the Council did not explicitly mention the protection of civilians, it reaffirmed 
the authorization contained in Resolution 1291. MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians thus 
at least formally remained in place. That it was not taken seriously is evident in the following 
statement of the Secretary General, of April 2001: “MONUC currently has neither the 
   
61 See the analysis of the humanitarian situation in the Reports by the Secretary General during this time period. 
62 S/2000/566, §§11ff. 
63 Such was the view of the ambassadors of the South African Development Community (SADC), see 
S/2000/1156, §13. Cf. Hawkins 2003.  
64 S/2001/128, §§71ff. 
65 Ibid. §77.  
66 S/RES/1341, OC 19. 
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mandate [this is incorrect67, N.L.] nor the strength to assume responsibility for the security of 
the civilian population”68. The Secretary General, however, acknowledged that, after the 
withdrawal of the foreign troops from Congolese territory, “the question of responsibility for 
the security of the civilian population must be addressed”69.  
Phase II. At the end of March, 2001, the first troops began to arrive in different parts of the 
DR Congo; by June, MONUC had reached the strength of 2366 military personnel70. While 
continuing their monitoring and verification tasks, the mission began to plan for “phase III” of 
its deployment which would involve the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, 
repatriation and resettlement (DDRRR) of members of armed groups71. The Secretary General 
emphasized that the parties to the conflict and the de-facto authorities in the different parts of 
the Congo were primarily responsible for the safety of the civilian population, and that 
MONUC’s role concerning the protection of civilians would “not least because of its small 
size and limited deployment” be restricted to monitoring the situation “to some extent”72. One 
year later, with 3800 troops on the ground, the Secretary General made even more explicitly 
clear that, while MONUC would do “its utmost”, it did “not have the means to provide 
broader protection to civilians at large”: “MONUC troops currently deployed in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo are not equipped, trained or configured to intervene 
rapidly to assist those in need of such protection”73.  
The incapacity of MONUC to protect civilians would become evident on various occasions. 
In May 2002, violence erupted in the city of Kisangani, and several dozens, possibly hundreds 
of civilians were killed, despite a MONUC presence of about 500 troops74. The MONUC 
leadership failed to convince the authorities to restore order, and MONUC patrols apparently 
were not of much effect75. In Kinshasa, discontent about MONUC’s failure to protect civilians 
expressed itself in violent demonstrations76. In spring 2003, ethnic violence in the North 
   
67 See e.g. S/2002/621, §71: “The Security Council has already decided, in its resolution 1291 (2000), that 
MONUC may take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it 
within its capabilities, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.  
68 S/2001/373, §98. In the Secretary General’s defence it should be noted that, considering the capacity of 
MONUC at that time, it would have been extremely dangerous for the troops on the ground to take the mandate 
seriously. 
69 Ibid.  
70 S/2001/572, §§22f. 
71 S/2001/373, §§95ff. 
72 S/2001/572, §95. 
73 S/2002/621, §71; ironically, the Security Council declared its support for the “steps” outlined in this paragraph 
of the Secretary General’s report, when it reaffirmed MONUC’s mandate, inter alia to protect civilians, in 
Resolution 1417 of 2002; see S/RES/1417, OC 7.  
74 Bafalikike 2002; Economist, 04 July 2002. 
75 S/2002/621, §§5ff. 
76 Ibid. §12. 
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Eastern province of Ituri, which had long been a cause of concern77, escalated to genocidal 
proportions78. MONUC’s strategy to provide “point security” at disarmament and 
demobilization sites and UN installations, leaving the responsibility for “umbrella security” to 
the local authorities79, became unbearable. The fighting not only in Ituri, but also in other 
parts of Eastern Congo, had disrupted and delayed MONUC’s disarmament and 
demobilization operations anyway.  
The escalation of violence in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, further intensified when the Ugandan 
Army, which had maintained a presence of 7000 troops in the town, withdrew in the 
beginning of May 2003. While the 720 MONUC peacekeepers “initially attempted to set-up 
roadblocks, restore order, conduct patrols and protect civilians”80, it soon became apparent 
that they were hardly able to protect their own personnel, and the mandate to protect civilians 
was abandoned. Militias took over control of the town, killing, raping and looting at will, and 
the population’s anger against MONUC became such that its personnel was threatened with 
lynching81. Under these circumstances, the Secretary General called on the Security Council 
to “urgently consider the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped 
force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as other vital 
installations in that town and protect the civilian population”82 until a reinforced MONUC 
presence could be established. Three days later, on 30 May, 2003, the Security Council 
authorized Operation Artemis, which will be discussed separately.  
Phase III. In Resolution 1493, of 28 July, 2003, the Security Council “split” MONUC’s 
mandate: on the one hand, the Council authorized the so-called “Ituri brigade”, a 3800 strong 
force which would take over control in Ituri after the withdrawal of Artemis, to use “all 
necessary means” to stabilize the security situation in Ituri, improve the humanitarian 
situation and protect displaced persons as well as the civilian population83. In the other parts 
of the country, and explicitly in the extremely volatile Kivu provinces, MONUC was, as 
before, supposed to protect only civilians “under immediate threat of physical violence” and 
only “as it deems within its capabilities”84 – an implicit recognition that, outside Ituri, 
MONUC’s equipment and manpower were still insufficient to ensure the protection of 
   
77 See e.g. S/2002/1005, §57, of September 2002, where the Secretary General describes the situation as 
„explosive“.  
78 See S/2003/556, §§9ff. 
79 S/2002/1005, §34. 
80 ICG, 13. June 2003, p.12. 
81 Ibid.  
82 S/2003/556, §98. 
83 S/RES/1493, OC 26, 27. The effectiveness of the Ituri Brigade will be discussed together with Operation 
Artemis below.  
84 Ibid. OC 25, 26. 
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civilians in all areas of its deployment. This became most obvious in the summer of 2004, 
when tensions between several rebel leaders rose in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu. By 
that time, MONUC had a strength of over 10,000 soldiers, with 450 troops around Bukavu, 
which were quickly reinforced to 100085. MONUC tried to create a buffer zone against a 
dissident rebel commander marching towards the city, but ultimately failed to protect 
anything but its own premises and about 4,000 internally displaced persons which had taken 
refuge there. While the Secretary General explained that the troops were “overstretched”, 
observers insisted that “the blue helmets could easily have scattered the rebels”86. In view of 
the Bukavu crisis, The Economist’s correspondent concluded that “since MONUC was first 
deployed to Congo in 1999, it has consistently failed to keep anyone in the region safe”; the 
correspondent even suggested that MONUC was “the world’s least effective UN 
peacekeeping force”87.  
The Bukavu crisis prompted the Secretary General to take the offensive vis-à-vis the Security 
Council. In his Third Special Report to the Council, he pointed out the mismatch between 
MONUC’s mandate and its capabilities more clearly than ever before:  
“The establishment of the peacekeeping mandate of MONUC under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations has raised expectations that the Mission will enforce the peace 
throughout the country. However, there is a wide gap between such expectations and the 
Mission’s capacity to fulfil them. […T]he gap between expectations and MONUC’s capacity 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has put United Nations personnel at risk. […G]iven 
the size of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC cannot be deployed everywhere, 
nor, for that matter, in significant strength in localities where hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions of people, are present. […] MONUC cannot assume responsibility for the 
maintenance of law and order in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”88.  
Based on these considerations, the Secretary General proposed a new “military concept of 
operations”89. Its endorsement by the Security Council in Resolution 1565, of October 01, 
2004, had a significant impact on MONUC’s effectiveness. MONUC’s record under the new 
mandate will be discussed below as “MONUC II”.  
 
Artemis and the Ituri Brigade (2003-2004). As described above, by the end of May 2003, 
the Security Council authorized the deployment of an “Interim Emergency Multinational 
Force” which would be allowed to use “all necessary means” to stabilize security conditions 
   
85 S/2004/650, §§35f. 
86 Economist, 04 December 2004. 
87 Ibid.  
88 S/2004/650, §§59, 76f. 
89 Ibid. §79ff. 
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in Bunia90, where hundreds of civilians had been killed by ethnic militias following the 
withdrawal of the Ugandan Army91. The 1000 strong force, with 500 supporting staff in 
Uganda, was provided by the European Union with France taking the lead92. On 6 June, the 
first French troops arrived at Bunia and soon took an assertive posture towards the militias93. 
Two militiamen were killed when they dared to challenge a French patrol. On June 22, the 
force commander issued an ultimatum to the militias to disarm or leave the town; weapons 
were from now on forbidden within Bunia and in a 10-km radius around the town. This ban 
was enforced with unprecedented resolve94. The security situation in Bunia improved 
considerably and internally displaced persons began to return to Bunia by the thousands95. In 
the end, no one doubted that Operation Artemis had achieved the aim “to reassure and to 
protect the population”96. Many, however, feared that the achievements of Artemis would 
prove unsustainable once the Europeans were relieved by reinforced MONUC forces.  
These fears proved unfounded thanks to the deployment of the so-called Ituri Brigade97. As 
described above, the Security Council split MONUC’s mandate in summer 2003, providing 
the Ituri Brigade with a more comprehensive and detailed mandate than the rest of MONUC 
and allocating more troops to Ituri than to any other area98. Even exceeding the number of 
troops originally requested (3,800)99, the Brigade, fully deployed by November 2004, 
comprised 4,800 soldiers100 – more than had been present in the whole of the DR Congo when 
the Ituri crisis erupted in the spring of 2003101. After it had taken control of Bunia, the 
Brigade began to deploy to other sensitive areas in Ituri, countering any military challenge 
with cordon-and-search operations, the seizure of weapons and the detention of suspects. At 
this point, the Brigade’s deployment outside Bunia was not only aimed at restoring security in 
these areas, but was also intended “to facilitate the future extension of the Interim 
Administration’s authority”102. By assuming an active role in the extension of state authority, 
   
90 S/RES/1484, OC 1, 4 
91 See Scheen 2003a. 
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93 Ibid. p. 518.  
94 Ibid. p. 519. Cf. Scheen 2003b. 
95 Scheen 2003b.  
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the MONUC de facto ceased to be a neutral actor in Ituri. To allow the political process to 
continue, it had to “dominate the armed factions”103 rather than to tolerate them. As a 
comparison with MONUC’s performance in other parts of the Congo shows, this politically 
proactive role – protecting the political process against “spoilers” – also proved to be a 
precondition for the effective protection of civilians. Outside Ituri, MONUC had neither the 
mandate nor the capacity to take this proactive role – and its attempts to protect civilians 
without interfering into military conflicts failed, as the Bukavu crisis most clearly showed104. 
In his Third Special Report, the Secretary General therefore requested a more comprehensive 
mandate for MONUC in general:  
“[T]he transitional process cannot be held hostage to armed challenges, as was the case in 
Bukavu in May-June. In such circumstances, MONUC should have the military capability to 
take action to support the transitional process and to deter such challenges while, at the same 
time, ensuring the protection of civilians who may be at risk”105.  
To ensure the military capability of MONUC to implement this more comprehensive 
mandate, the Secretary General requested an additional 13,100 troops, including additional air 
force capacity, which would have more than doubled MONUC’s manpower106. While the 
Security Council provided the mandate, in Resolution 1565 of 1 October, 2004, it only 
authorized an increase in troop strength of 5,900 soldiers107. Nevertheless, the Council 
enabled MONUC to take a much more assertive stance towards the militias, especially in 
Eastern Congo, as will be analysed in the following section.  
 
MONUC II (2004-2005). Under the new mandate, MONUC was not only authorized to 
protect civilians, but also “to deploy and maintain a presence in the key areas of potential 
volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, in 
particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process”108. In Resolution 
1592, of March 2005, the Council further stressed that, “in accordance with its mandate, 
MONUC may use cordon and search tactics to prevent attacks on civilians and disrupt the 
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military capability of illegal armed groups that continue to use violence in those areas [i.e. the 
eastern part of the DR Congo, N.L.]”109.  
Since the Security Council had authorized less than half of the increase in troops requested by 
the Secretary General, MONUC could deploy in brigade-size only in North and South Kivu110 
(in addition to Ituri), not in Katanga and the Kasai provinces, where gross human rights 
violations consequently “continued unabated”111. In the Kivu provinces, by contrast, the 
reinforcement enabled MONUC to take actions specifically designed to protect the civilian 
population: the establishment of security zones, the dismantling of militia camps, cordon-and-
search operations, the setting up of checkpoints etc. In areas where civilians are in extreme 
danger due to the presence of the notorious Rwandan Hutu militias, MONUC has begun to 
employ foot patrols, which have been supported by “rapid reaction helicopter units”, and has 
set up an early warning system112. MONUC has also been supporting the newly established 
and still fragile Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in its efforts to 
forcibly disarm the militias – something MONUC itself has no mandate to do (yet113). There 
were still a number of incidents, especially outside the areas of MONUC’s deployment, where 
civilians were targeted and killed. And the pressure on the militias became such that in some 
cases they threatened reprisals against the civilian population to deter further MONUC and 
FARDC action against them114. But overall, the peacekeeping mission has succeeded in 
improving the security situation in both Kivu provinces considerably115.  
However, MONUC has been most successful in re-establishing security for the civilian 
population in Ituri. Under heavy military pressure from MONUC and FARDC, 15,000 militia 
members had voluntarily disarmed by June 2005116. Only about 1,200 “armed elements” were 
estimated to have remained in the bush117, and recent reports suggest that by now the majority 
of these also had to surrender and disarm118. As a result, ever more internally displaced 
persons have returned to Ituri and the humanitarian situation has further improved.  
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Assessment. In the first four years of its deployment, MONUC was ineffective in providing 
protection to the civilian population. While it did not even have troops on the ground which 
could have protected civilians in phase I, in phase II it did not muster the capacity to protect 
civilians either, and not even seriously aspired to do so. Far from effectively controlling its 
areas of deployment, it was only during phase III that MONUC made cautious attempts to 
implement specific measures for the protection of civilians. When put to test, as in Bukavu, 
however, it failed. The Artemis force, on the other hand, adopted a far more assertive 
approach. It established control over its area of deployment and thereby considerably 
increased the safety of the civilian population. The Ituri Brigade, which succeeded Artemis, 
was able to uphold this level of protection and even extend it to further parts of Ituri. 
MONUC’s new mandate (of October 2004) enabled the mission to employ those strategies 
which had been successful in Ituri in other parts of the country, especially in the Kivus. 
Consequently, the safety of the civilian population notably increased in the Eastern parts of 
the DR Congo. In sum, MONUC I was ineffective, while Artemis and the Ituri Brigade, as 
well as MONUC II, were effective in protecting the civilian population. 
 
4.2.3. Liberia 
Background. In June 2003, only three months before the deployment of the first UN 
peacekeeping mission in Liberia, the Secretary General – in his assessment report to the 
Security Council – made the following insightful observation: 
“Liberia remains the epicenter of the continuing endemic instability, which is gravely 
affecting the political, humanitarian and security landscape not only in the Mano River 
Union subregion but also throughout much of West Africa.”119 
His comments, coming at a time when the country was seemingly plunging once again into 
civil war, help draw the political map of a conflict which ravaged the Mano River countries120 
– Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea – for more than a decade, starting with the early 1990s. In 
a region characterized by potentially explosive ethnic conflicts and shady political 
maneuvering, the complicated allegiances between politicians, rebel groups, military, and 
unofficial militias actively contributed to the creation of a pervasive culture of impunity and 
massive human rights violations. Unofficial ties between presidential hopefuls, such as 
General Gueï of Côte d’Ivoire – the mastermind of the 1999 Ivorian coup d’état – and the 
Liberian Charles Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group, 
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reveal the workings of regional networks of power which helped maintain a climate of 
political instability121. In this context, as the Secretary General pointed out in March 2005, 
“durable peace” within the region – Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone — could only be 
achieved if “a number of key issues [are] addressed at both the national and the subregional 
level” 122. These key issues referred to the tackling of what the Secretary General identified as 
the “the root causes” of instability: the active recruitment of ex-combatants, the lack of 
coordination in disarmament and demobilization programs, failure to prevent human rights 
violations, non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement etc. By emphasizing the need for a 
new, integrated type of approach in dealing with local warfare, the Secretary General also 
signalled that the international community was finally talking a proactive stance in Liberia, 
whose civilian population had experienced two civil wars, massive displacement, and human 
rights abuses123.  
The roots of the Liberian crisis can be traced as far back as 1980, when Master Sergeant 
Samuel Doe’s military coup brutally ousted from power President William Tolbert Jr. and laid 
the seeds for the country’s first civil war (1989 - 1997). The subsequent period of violent 
clashes between insurgents – among which a prominent faction was Charles Taylor’s National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – and governmental forces officially ended with the signing 
of the Abuja Agreement on August 19, 1995, brokered by ECOWAS. Despite several 
ceasefire violations and armed attacks, the July 1997 presidential elections – declared free and 
fair by international observers – legitimized the de facto leadership of Charles Taylor and 
succeeded in re-stabilizing the country. Peace was however short-lived, and by April 1999 
hostilities were re-opened with a new, reconfigured set of political actors: LURD, (Liberians 
United for Reconciliation and Democracy) representing the largest anti-Taylor rebel faction 
and having Guinea as a likely sponsor124, the so-called MODEL or the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia, potentially backed by Côte d’Ivoire’s Laurent Gbagbo125, and the 
president’s security forces, split between various independent and competing units126. By May 
2003 however, when it had become clear that the NPFL was losing the war, international 
mediation succeeded in bringing the parties back to the negotiation table. The result was the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by all major stakeholders in Accra, Ghana on 
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August 18. President Taylor handed over power to Vice-President Moses Blah and left 
Liberia for a comfortable exile in Nigeria. A National Transitional Government was agreed 
upon, and provisions were made for the organization of presidential elections in October 
2005, which took place according to the initial schedule and resulted in the election of 
Liberia’s first woman President: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.  
Despite maintaining a rather low profile in the Liberian crisis – mostly handled internationally 
by ECOWAS, which had established an observer mission in Monrovia, ECOMOG (The 
Military Observer Group), as early as 1990 – the UN involvement in the country’s civil wars 
had been quite constant, although not necessarily effective in terms of civilian protection. 
The two consecutive UN missions – UNOMIL (the United Nations Observer Mission in 
Liberia) authorized by Security Council Resolution 866 of September 22, 1993 and UNOL 
(The United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia) established by the Secretary 
General on November 1, 1997 – had largely played an advisory role, helping either the 
ECOWAS mission, or the Liberian Government in implementing peace agreements and 
providing logistic support for the 1997 election (UNOMIL) and for the further consolidation 
of the peace process (UNOL). Although the Security Council had been aware of massive 
human rights abuses prior to and after the election of Charles Taylor, it decided – at least until 
the 1999 outbreak of violence – not to upgrade its missions to the level of peacekeeping 
operations. However, the UN position changed considerably after the signing of the Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The parties invited the Council to deploy a peacekeeping 
force in Liberia “to support the National Transitional Government and assist in the 
implementation of the Peace Agreement”127 and to ensure, in general, the stability of the 
country’s democratically elected regime. 
 
UNMIL (2003 – 2005). Answering these international requests for a stronger UN presence in 
Liberia, the Security Council issued Resolution 1497 of August 1, 2003, authorizing the 
deployment of an ECOWAS mission – ECOMIL – as the first step in a peacekeeping 
operation which would ultimately establish a longer-term UN stabilization force. The 
ECOMIL multinational unit – the result of an extraordinary ECOWAS summit at Accra on 
July 31, 2003 – was mandated among others to support the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreement and to ensure a level of security that would enable the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance. The issues of civilian protection and human rights violations figured high on the 
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Security Council’s agenda, an outcome perhaps of UN’s previous failure to effectively 
address these problems during Liberia’s two decades of political instability.  
In his preliminary September 2003 report, while presenting his recommendations regarding 
the size, structure, and mandate of a follow-up UN mission, the Secretary General estimated 
that as a consequence of ongoing fighting and regime brutality nearly 1,000,000 people – 
from a population of approximately 2,5 million – had been displaced, either internally or as 
refugees in neighbouring countries such as Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, the 
report mentioned that since 1989 from an estimated number of 250,000 war victims 
approximately half of them had been non-combatants128. According to the Secretary General, 
eyewitness accounts as well as reports of mass graves – some of them dating back to 1990 – 
were just as many proofs testifying about the level of violence which the country had 
experienced, with all factions equally accused of having reverted to torture, mutilations, 
sexual violence, killings, and the use of child soldiers. The militarization of Liberian society 
and the proliferation of militia groups lacking any “statutory command and control 
structure”129 had triggered, argued the Secretary General, the creation of “culture of 
violence”130 which could only be eliminated by concerted UN actions131.  
In the light of these recommendations and based on the findings of the UN multidisciplinary 
assessment mission led by the Secretary General’s Special Representative Jacques Paul Klein, 
the Security Council passed resolution 1509 of September 19, 2003 authorizing the 
deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Its mandate focused on five 
important tasks: (1) the implementation of the ceasefire; (2) the protection of United Nations 
staff, facilities, and civilians; (3) support for humanitarian and human rights assistance; (4) 
support for security reform; and (5) support for the implementation of the peace process. 
Overall, UNMIL was assigned to start the much needed DDRR program (disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration), to ensure the security of both locals and 
humanitarian workers, and – on a more general level – to help pacifying the country ahead of 
the scheduled October 2005 elections. The mission – which was to be deployed throughout 
Liberia in four major sectors with the headquarters in Monrovia132 – consisted of up to 15,000 
authorized military personnel, including approximately 250 military observers and 160 staff 
officers as well as a maximum of 1,115 civilian police officers. On October 1, 2003 the 
ECOMIL forces underwent a “re-hatting” procedure as UN personnel, thus signaling the 
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complete takeover of its peacekeeping functions by the newly established UNMIL, under the 
command of Special Representative Klein. The deployment of troops occurred in several 
stages, with soldiers being gradually relocated from Monrovia to all the above-mentioned 
sectors. Despite continuing violent clashes between rebels, peacekeepers, and governmental 
forces, the Secretary General’s first progress report emphasized the “considerable progress 
achieved in consolidating stability in Monrovia and its surroundings”133. By March 2004, 
after the deployment of additional troops, the Secretary General maintained that although 
human rights violations were still reported throughout Liberia “most of the abuses and 
violations had taken place in isolated areas where peacekeepers ha[d] not been deployed”134. 
The positive trend in reducing criminality and countering violent looting perpetrated by 
former combatants is obvious in his subsequent reports to the Security Council. Moreover, the 
changing nature of these attacks – usually conducted by disaffected former combatants or 
LURD splinter factions – suggested that the conflict’s scale was reduce from formerly well-
organized and destabilizing forms of protest to “minor crimes” and “civil unrest”135. As an 
example of the mission’s strength, both in terms of its military and civilian components, in his 
December 2004 report the Secretary General praised the swift UNMIL reaction to a series of 
incidents which had occurred between 28 and 31 October, when an initial land dispute had 
quickly escalated into severe rioting and burning of private property. Although initially 
deploying only its civilian police, in the face of mounting street pressure UNMIL “undertook 
robust action to bring the situation under control and forestall further acts of violence in the 
affected areas”136.“Robust action” meant fast redeployment of one infantry and two additional 
police units to Monrovia, patrols in the dangerous sections of the city conducted by the 
UNMIL Quick Reaction Force, aerial reconnaissance and show-of-force patrols over the city, 
the sealing of Monrovia’s main entry points (or roads), and cordon-and-search operations. 
Military actions were enforced by radio appeals to calm coming from Special representative 
Jacques Paul Klein, officials of the National Transitional Government, and members of the 
Inter-Religious Council of Liberia. A light curfew was also imposed by the Chairman of the 
National Transition Government, Gyude Bryant. The result was the quick restoration of order 
with minimum casualties137. The successful coordination of actions between various UNMIL 
units and Liberian officials proved that provocative attacks by ex-combatants and active rebel 
factions could be effectively controlled. In terms of civilian protection achievements, the 
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improved security conditions ensured that the UNMIL human rights unit could focus on 
monitoring and registering abuses as well as in actively advising the government on the 
implementation of adequate legislation138. In February 2006, the independent expert on the 
situation of human rights in Liberia, Charlotte Abaka, submitted a comprehensive report on 
the issue and mentioned that “improvements in the security situation have enhanced freedom 
of movement and facilitated the conduct of national elections”139. Although, as the Secretary 
General pointed out in his last report on Liberia, in December 2005, the situation was “calm, 
but fragile”140, substantial progress had been made in re-establishing the rule of law. Recently, 
the Security Council – indirectly acknowledging these positive developments – has decided to 
redeploy UNMIL personnel for the protection of the Special Court for Sierra Leone141 and a 
maximum of one infantry company for UNOCI142, the United Nations’ Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
 
Assessment. Overall, taking into consideration the two indicators of effectiveness we have so 
far analyzed, it has become clear from the analytical reading of the case study that UNMIL 
has fulfilled its mandated task. Given the efficiency of its measures for the restoration of order 
(indicator 2) and the protection of civilians within its areas of deployment as well as the 
control (indicator 1) exercised by UN troops over Liberia’s territory, our assessment of the 
case is positive: UNMIL has been effective in protecting civilians. 
 
4.2.4. Côte d’Ivoire 
Background. By early 2006, Côte d’Ivoire remained de facto split between two spheres of 
influence – the south, held by government forces loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo and the 
north, conquered and administered by the Forces Nouvelles rebels143. Such a situation could 
have hardly been anticipated during the years of stability and growth following the 1960 
independence from France. Under President Félix Houphouet-Boigny (1960 -1993), “the 
Ivorian miracle” of the 1960s and 1970s had transformed the country into one of the world’s 
largest cocoa and coffee producers.  To the astonishment of neighbouring countries and the 
international community, these decades of prosperity were replaced by a cycle of violence, 
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human rights abuses, successful or failed coup d’état(s), and a general descent into ethnic and 
religious divides144.  
Political instability, triggered in part by the economic downturn of the 1980s, followed shortly 
after President Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993 and sparked a series of nation-wide 
debates regarding issues such as national identity or “Ivoirité”, citizenship rights, public office 
eligibility145, and rural land tenure146. The starting point of the Ivorian civil war is generally 
credited to the series of attacks conducted on September 19, 2002 by former army members 
against the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké, and Korhongo. The strikes, initially violent protests 
against a planned demobilization of army personnel, soon mutated into a full-blown rebellion 
that effectively sized control of the northern territory. Although the international community, 
mainly France – through operation Licorne (or Unicorn) – and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) was quick in attempting a mediation of the conflict, the 
country remained divided and the situation of civilians worsened. Human rights abuses such 
as torture, indiscriminate killing, rape, abductions and massacres were reported from both 
regions. A fact-finding mission headed by the UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human 
Rights which visited Côte d’Ivoire between 23 and 29 December 2002, identified 
approximately 600,000 displaced people147 and numerous violations of human rights148: 
summary executions, accusations of mass graves, illegal detentions, forced disappearances, 
abusive arrests, torture, sexual violence especially against women, the use of child soldiers, 
media incitement to ethnic hatred and xenophobia. Moreover, allegations of foreign 
interfering, such as the alleged support of Ivorian rebels by Liberian President Charles 
Taylor149 and Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré150, were exchanged between both sides and 
the spillover effects of Liberia’s own internal disarray transformed the Ivorian/ Liberian 
border into a continued zone of conflict and arms smuggling with mutual accusations of 
interference. Among the first political mediators, France had deployed peacekeeping troops as 
early as September 2002 in a buffer zone across Côte d’Ivoire, known as the Zone of 
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Confidence and ECOWAS had decided at its Accra Summit (Ghana) on September 29, 2002 
to set up a similar unit (ECOMICI). Moreover, high representatives from both France (such as 
the foreign minister Dominique de Villepin) and ECOWAS tried jointly to broker the return 
to peaceful negotiations and to a general ceasefire. The first significant result, the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement of January 24, 2003 signed by all Ivorian political actors promised to 
be the starting point of an overall renunciation to violence leading to political reforms and the 
organization of free elections. The United Nations were invited to supervise the 
implementation of the peace process and to legitimize the work of the future Government of 
National Reconciliation. In his March 2003 report, the Secretary General recommended that 
“the United Nations should consider playing a role that would complement the operations of 
the French and ECOWAS forces”151. The Security Council acted upon these requests and 
after formally authorizing the French and ECOWAS peacekeepers to operate under Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter152, issued a second resolution on May 13, 2003 establishing the first 
United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI)153. Endowed with a small civilian unit 
and up to 76 military personnel, the Mission was meant to establish liaisons with the involved 
parties, i.e. governmental officials and rebel factions, and to offer logistic support for the 
implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement. However, despite initial success, the 
peace process soon floundered and several months later, in his January 2004 report, the 
Secretary General was recommending a reconfiguration of UN participation and the 
deployment of a peacekeeping force which “would take over and reinforce the role being 
performed by ECOMICI in the Zone of Confidence”154 while at the same time closely 
collaborating with the French Licorne. The Secretary General emphasized the mixed results 
achieved in the implementation of the peace agreement, the reluctance of main political 
stakeholders in complying with its requirements, and the continued human rights violations 
reported by MINUCI. The overall conclusion was by no means positive. While 
acknowledging the steps taken towards the implementation of a durable peace process, the 
Secretary-General strongly condemned the constant undermining of such initiatives: 
“It is clear that there are hard-line elements among the Ivorian parties who are 
determined to undermine the peace process and who are tempted to seek a military 
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solution to the crisis. They should not be allowed to succeed and, to that end, it is 
essential that the international community provide support to the efforts of those who 
are working to promote the effective implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis 
Agreement.”155  
 
UNOCI (2004 – 2005). In response to the growing demand for UN involvement and 
recognizing the volatile situation in Côte d’Ivoire, on February 27, 2004 the Security Council 
decided to deploy a UN Peacekeeping mission in the Zone of Confidence. Resolution 1528 
established the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) on a renewable mandate 
of 12 months, starting from April 4. UNOCI’s authorized military strength amounted to 6,240 
personnel, including military observers, staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers. 
The mission was mandated to take over the functions fulfilled by both MINUCI and 
ECOWAS, with the latter’s ECOMICI contingent undergoing a “re-hatting” process as UN 
peacekeepers. Regarding the plight of the civilian population, whose sufferings had been one 
of the main reasons for the mission’s operation, the mandate requested UNOCI to “protect 
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of 
deployment”156. The Resolution also provided for the coordination of UN forces with the 
French Licorne soldiers (approximately 4,000 troops) and requested the latter to offer full 
support to UNOCI particularly with respect to security issues within the areas of activity and 
military interventions either in support of the mission, or against belligerent actions outside its 
scope157. Although the Secretary-General’s recommendations158 had been fully complied 
with, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire soon deteriorated, straining UNOCI’s resources and flatly 
revealing the mission’s incapacity to ensure the safety of civilians within the boundaries of its 
deployment area.  
The first incident in a series of violent outbursts occurred on March 25, 2004 in Abidjan – 
Côte d’Ivoire’s economic capital – when a crackdown by state security forces on an 
opposition-led demonstration159 resulted in at least 120 people killed, 274 wounded and 20 
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disappeared160. After two days of social unrest, with the help of international mediators such 
as ECOWAS, the African Union and the UN Secretary-General the tension was diffused and 
the parties returned once again to the negotiation table161. However, the situation continued to 
worsen. In his August 2004 report Kofi Annan referred to armed conflicts occurring on both 
sides of the Zone of Confidence as well as to violent street protests against UN and Licorne 
forces carried out by the so-called “youth” organizations (such as the “Young Patriots” or 
Congres Panafricain des Jeunes Patriotes - COJEP), mainly urban militias supporting 
President Laurent Gbagbo162. By June, the protests had intensified and anonymous threats had 
been issued against UNOCI and Licorne personnel, accused of having failed to prevent the 
March clashes163. According to the Secretary General, Côte d’Ivoire’s human rights record 
had become more than precarious and the lack of political will in prosecuting offenders 
contributed to the creation of a “climate of impunity”164. 
The tension peaked on November 4 when in a unilateral violation of the ceasefire the National 
Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) – following President’s Gbagbo’s orders – launched 
air attacks against several rebel strongholds. Two days later the Licorne base in Bouaké was 
bombed – in what was claimed to be a misdirected strike – killing nine French soldiers and 
wounding 38 others165. When the Licorne forces retaliated by destroying the country’s 
aircraft, violent anti-French street protests broke out in Abidjan with a frenzy of hate speech 
and media incitement to violence against foreigners surging across the country. More than a 
particularly embarrassing moment for the international community, with Ivorian authorities 
accusing peacekeepers of violating the country’s territorial sovereignty166, the ensuing attacks 
against Western residents soon led to the repatriation of approximately 9,000 people, in what 
became – according to Human Right Watch – “the largest evacuation of expatriates in the 
country’s post-colonial history”167.  
The problematic response of the Licorne forces and the security issues experienced by 
UNOCI – such as the need to partially evacuate UN and UNOCI personnel to Accra on 
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November 10th168 – revealed the difficulties which the mission encountered in carrying out its 
mandate. In an interview for Human Rights Watch the UNOCI force commander, Major-
General Abdoulaye Fall pointed out:  
“November showed that Unicorn were not our rapid reaction force. They redeployed 
to protect French and other foreign nationals in Abidjan […]”. Moreover, “The second 
lesson is that we too are not strong enough. We had to send troops to protect sites in 
the Abidjan area.”169 
The failure to protect the local civilian population, especially the groups of immigrants and 
northerners who had become a preferred target for “young patriots” squads, was also 
acknowledged by an undisclosed UN official: “Our ability to protect people is limited. The 
French are here to look after mainly the French. There are African foreigners, Lebanese and 
others who would be vulnerable again”170. Prior and after November 2004, urban violence and 
repeated incursions within the zone of confidence by both rebels and state security forces 
revealed UNOCI’s limited capacity to prevent indiscriminate killing and other human rights 
violations even within its area of deployment171. As a Human Rights Watch report points out, 
the necessity to protect UN personnel and sites left little room for anything else172.In his 
December 2004 report the Secretary General remarked that the November incidents “had 
strained to the limit UNOCI’s capacity to implement its mandate” and recommended, in view 
of the changed circumstances, an increase in the mission’s military component amounting to a 
total of 1,226 personnel and eight attack and light helicopters173.  
The UN’s response to the increasingly violent character of Ivorian politics was swift. On 
November 15 the Security Council passed resolution 1572 instituting an arms embargo on 
Côte d’Ivoire – later to be supervised by a Group of Experts (Resolution 1584 of 1 February 
2005) – and calling for the implementation of travel and economic and sanctions against any 
individual considered to represent a threat to the peace process174. The Council also made 
provisions for the setting-up of a Sanctions Committee charged with the designation of such 
persons or entities175. Moreover, considering the deteriorating political situation and the 
general uncertainty surrounding the period after the end of President’s Gbagbo’s 
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constitutional term (in October 2005)176, the United Nations decided to extend UNOCI’s 
mandate first until January 24, 2006177 and ultimately until December 15, 2006178. The 
mission was authorized to monitor and enforce the arms embargo and to use force against any 
potential obstructions to the mission or the French troops’ actions and freedom of 
movement179. This measure was meant to enhance UNOCI’s conflict prevention capacity by 
allowing its personnel to actively prevent and not only respond to security breaches. 
Additionally, acknowledging the need for an increased protection of UN personnel and more 
resources in the performing of its specified tasks, Resolution 1657 of February 6, 2006 
approved the redeployment of one infantry company from UNIMIL (United Nations Mission 
in Liberia) to UNOCI, until March 31, 2006. 
However, the practical results of these measures have not been very successful in terms of 
civilian protection. UNOCI’s human rights division continued to monitor and report a 
worrying number of humanitarian law violations, including in the Zone of Confidence, where 
– it was argued – the lack of state institutions, particularly police and justice, had triggered the 
creation of a “culture of impunity”180. During January and February 2005, the unit registered 
– within the area of deployment – an increase in violence, with armed robberies, inter-ethnic 
clashes, rape, and extortions becoming more often then not part of a civilian’s daily life181. 
Despite the widening of UNOCI’s mandate with respect to violence prevention, the main 
issue in ensuring adequate protection remained the mission’s insufficient personnel. In March 
2005 the Secretary General noticed that further reinforcements were required due to “the 
deteriorating security situation, in particular in the Zone of Confidence”182. As the clashes 
between rebels, state security forces and armed militias intensified, more troops were needed 
to ensure a better protection of UNOCI staff and infrastructure in Abidjan as well as to restore 
the mission’s capacity within the Zone of Confidence183. In his last report – January 2006 – 
the Secretary General warned that “UNOCI troops are thinly stretched throughout the 
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country” and requested a further increase in its numbers by four additional battalions and an 
aviation unit, which had actually been demanded (and approved by the Security Council) as 
early as December 2004184. The report concluded that in light of Côte d’Ivoire’s increasingly 
violent political climate, UNOCI’s ability to fulfill its multiple tasks was severely hampered.  
 
Assessment. In the light of continued human rights abuses within the Zone of Confidence, as 
monitored and reported by UNOCI’s specialized unit, it becomes clear that the mission as not 
able to ensure the security of civilians living within the perimeters of the buffer zone. Despite 
additional enforcement offered by the French Licorne troops, the Secretary General’s reports 
to the Security Council pointed out in unambiguous terms that the lack of resources – either in 
terms of weaponry (such as the missing aviation unit requested as early as 2004) or of 
manpower – severely obstructed the mission’s protection capabilities. Particularly during the 
events of November 2004 – when part of UNOCI and other UN personnel were evacuated to 
Accra – these structural deficiencies revealed the mission’s incapacity to secure the areas of 
its deployment especially when faced with multiple street uprisings. Moreover, the inability to 
prevent violent actions in the Zone of Confidence was also the direct effect of an insufficient 
implementation of adequate protection measures. Due to multiple tasks and limited personnel 
UNOCI had limited potential for regular patrols, a factor which increased the vulnerability of 
Ivorians living within the buffer zone. Overall, our conclusion is that until 2006 UNOCI was 
ineffective in fulfilling its mandate. 
 
4.2.5. Burundi 
Background. In 1993, the assassination of Burundi’s first democratically elected president 
sparked the latest bloody conflict in the Central African country’s long history of inter-ethnic 
strife185. By now, the conflict, which pitted the Tutsi-dominated Burundian army against 
various armed opposition groups, has been largely settled. After a five-year period of political 
transition, which started in August 2000 with the signing of the Arusha Agreement186 and 
ended in summer 2005 with the inauguration of a democratically elected government187, only 
one small rebel group, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), remains outside the peace 
process. Its frequent clashes with the Burundian Armed Forces (FAB) continue to pose a 
threat to the civilian population.  
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The United Nations became seriously involved in Burundi only in 2004 when the transitional 
process was already very advanced188. But this extremely late involvement is not the only 
significant difference between the UN’s role in Burundi and the cases discussed so far: As 
opposed to the DR Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Burundi was by no means a “failed 
state” when the UN became involved. In particular, the Burundian Army remained extremely 
strong and was perfectly capable of fighting the rebels. The dominant position of the 
Burundian Army would severely limit the role UN peacekeepers could play in the protection 
of civilians, as compared to the other case studies.  
 
ONUB (2004-2005). On May 21, 2004, the Security Council authorized the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi (ONUB), with a mandate, among other tasks, to “use all necessary 
means […], without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional Government of Burundi, 
to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”189. ONUB would consist of 
5,650 military personnel, including about 2,500 “re-hatted” African Union peacekeepers, 
which had been deployed to Burundi since April 2003, as well as additional contingents from 
Pakistan and Nepal. 
In August 2004, at a time when ONUB totalled 3,312 troops, 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees 
were massacred at an UNHCR transit camp at Gatumba in Eastern Burundi190. ONUB 
consequently deployed troops to various refugee camps in the West191, and the Western 
provinces, especially the largely unsecured border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
became the focus of ONUB’s attention192. ONUB also increased its patrols in Bujumbura 
Rurale province, the main theatre of FNL-FAB clashes and therefore the part of Burundi with 
the worst human rights situation193.  
Although the Secretary General, in view of the situation in the Western provinces, declared 
the protection of civilians a “core concern”194, it is hard to discern any impact MONUC has 
made on the protection of civilians. The bulk of human rights violation, including killings of 
civilians, extrajudicial executions, and sexual violence, occurred in the areas where the 
Burundian Army was fighting the FNL, and quite frequently at the hands of Burundian 
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soldiers195. Apart from occasions where civilians sought refugee at ONUB premises, to 
provide physical protection to civilians in these circumstances would have been extremely 
dangerous and difficult: On the one hand, it is hard to see how ONUB could have protected 
civilians from those FNL attacks which even the far more capable Burundian Army was not 
able to prevent196. On the other hand, there is no way ONUB’s mandate could be interpreted 
as authorizing it to militarily confront the Burundian Armed Forces in cases they were 
responsible for human rights violations, often against alleged FNL supporters197. For these 
reasons, ONUB’s role in providing physical protection to civilians was extremely limited. 
Instead, the mission focused on monitoring the human rights situation198 and emphasised the 
need to end the “culture of impunity”199 by strengthening the judicial system and holding 
members of the Armed Forces which were responsible for human rights violations 
accountable200.  
 
Assessment. Although ONUB’s direct impact on the safety of the civilian population has 
been extremely limited, it is hard to call the mission outright ineffective due to its limited 
room of manoeuvre alongside the Burundian Army, and the relatively stable security 
situation, compared to the other case studies, which already prevailed when ONUB was 
deployed. There was no need for ONUB to establish “effective control” over its areas of 
deployment because this control was already exercised by the Burundian Army. ONUB’s 
monitoring activities and its tireless insisting that the Burundian Army respect human rights 
was the most sustainable approach it could take, especially in view of its mandate which 
allowed it to protect civilians only “without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional 
Government of Burundi”. To ensure respect for human rights within its own army clearly is 
the responsibility of the Burundian Government. On the other hand, one can only speculate 
whether the specific measures implemented by MONUC in order to protect civilians, namely 
the patrols around refugee camps, could have stopped another attack of the scale of the 
August 2004 Gatumba massacre. The fact is that such an attack has not been attempted.  
The effectiveness of a peacekeeping mission in protecting civilians also has to be assessed in 
the light of what could have possibly been achieved if there had been more troops, more 
resources, and a stronger commitment to the protection of civilians etc.. In the case of ONUB, 
   
195 See e.g. S/2004/682, §41; S/2004/902, §37; S/2005/149, §52. 
196 See e.g. S/2005/586, §24f. 
197 See e.g. 2005/149, §25; S/2005/149, §52; S/2005/586, §26. 
198 S/2004/682, §46; S/2005/328, §§33f. 
199 S/2004/902, §63. 
200 See e.g. S/2005/586, §27. 
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the value added in terms of civilian protection would probably have been marginal, as the 
reasons for ONUB’s limited impact on the safety of the civilian population do not lay with the 
mission’s capabilities, but with the constellation of forces in Burundi. For a peacekeeping 
mission there is not much room for manoeuvre in terms of civilian protection in a country 
with an effective, but abusive army fighting a counter-insurgency war against a small rebel 
group. Peacekeeping is no remedy for an abusive army; monitoring, awareness raising 
campaigns, the strengthening of the judicial system and human rights education is. And there 
certainly is no rationale for a UN peacekeeping mission to engage in a counter-insurgency 
war when there is a national army which can do the job. In this context, the role of the UN 
mission should be to facilitate a political solution to the insurgency, which is exactly what 
ONUB, at the time of writing, seemed to be achieving201. In sum, within the limits of what 
was meaningful for it to do, ONUB has been effective in contributing to the protection of the 
civilian population, even if in a rather indirect manner. 
 
4.3. Summary 
Taking into consideration the two indicators for the assessment of a mission’s effectiveness, 
namely “control of area of deployment” and “implementation of specific measures” the 
following results have been identified:  
 
Table 2: Assessment of Effectiveness 
 
 UN Mission Assessment: Effective/Ineffective Country 
C1 UNAMSIL I. Ineffective Sierra Leone 
C2 UNAMSIL II. Effective Sierra Leone 
C3 MONUC I. Ineffective Democratic Republic of Congo 
C4 Artemis/Ituri 
Brigade 
Effective Democratic Republic of Congo 
C5 MONUC II. Effective Democratic Republic of Congo 
C6 UNMIL Effective Liberia 
C7 UNOCI Ineffective Côte d’Ivoire 
C8 ONUB Ineffective Burundi 
 
 
5. Explaining the Effectiveness of UN Forces in the Protection of Civilians 
Having assessed the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, we will now proceed with 
the second part of our research, namely data analysis. First, we apply the already mentioned 
set of factors to the narratives of our case studies. This analytic frame, identified during the 
exploratory phase of our research, is detailed in section 5.1 where we also make more explicit 
the rationale behind our choice of factors. After applying this scheme to our case studies and 
   
201 Peterson 2006. 
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subsequently explaining our reasons for assigning either positive or negative values to the 
factors (Section 5.2), the overall results are summarized in section 5.3. In Table 9 – “the truth 
table” – both causal conditions and outcomes are identified as either “present” or “absent” and 
coded as “yes” and respectively, “no” (with their adjacent values). This “presence - absence” 
dichotomy is useful in systematizing our data and offers us the basis for a further 
simplification of factor configurations. Table 10 summarizes the simplification procedure and 
presents the final results. 
 
5.1. Identifying Factors for the Explanation 
The subsequent list of factors represents, in our view, a comprehensive summary of all the 
conditions which we have found to be relevant for the explanation of outcomes. Factors have 
been coded as either “yes” (present) with a value of “1”, or “no” (absent) with a value of “0”. 
The following explanations are aimed at clarifying the terminology we use in our analysis and 
describing the effects (positive/negative) which these factors regularly have on the mission’s 
effectiveness. 
 
(F1) Size: “Size” is, even intuitively, one of the most important factors in UN interventions, 
since the number of troops on the ground has so many times proved to be a paramount 
element in the prevention of civilian casualties. Following this line of thinking, our 
assumption is that a successful mission should be characterized by an adequate level of 
troops. Since “adequacy” is rather difficult to measure – due to differences in country sizes 
and spread of conflicts – we have decided to indirectly identify this factor by reference to its 
perceived value, either positively “adequate” or negatively “inadequate”. The perceptions we 
have referred to are, among others, official evaluations of the Secretary General to the 
Security Council, declarations from UN officials on the status of personnel resources, and any 
other official source which might help us understand whether the mission’s troops level was 
considered sufficient. 
 
(F2) Equipment: Closely linked to the issue of size, equipment refers to a mission’s actual 
endowment in terms of weapons, machines, aviation units etc. Once again, due to 
measurement difficulties, we have relied on self-assessments, coming from UN officials and 
independent observers. An example of a situation in which “equipment” is judged to be 
inadequate would be the UN operation in Cote d’Ivoire, where the Secretary General 
mentions in three consecutive reports that the lack of an aviation unit – approved by the 
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Security Council, but with no Member State willing to contribute it – severely hampered the 
operational efficiency of UNOCI. 
 
(F3) Commitment: An intangible factor, “commitment” refers to the psychological outlook of 
the deployed troops. We assume that a positive attitude as opposed to a demoralized attitude 
has a positive effect on the operation’s effectiveness. The commitment of troops is most 
evident in situations of danger where they are confronted with resistance in the 
implementation of their mandate, or when they are attacked. Although in some cases it may 
simply be prudent, due to the constellation of forces, not to take on the adversaries, the extent 
to which peacekeepers are prepared to risk their lives in the fulfilment of their mandate is a 
good indicator for their commitment to the mission. 
 
(F4) Credibility: Whether a UN peacekeeping force is credible depends on a number of 
factors, especially the size, equipment and commitment of troops and the speed and resolve 
with which they are deployed. However, credibility is more than the sum of these factors in 
that it refers to the perception of the parties to the conflict rather than to the “objective” 
quality of the factors. As the Secretary General points out: “A mission that is perceived as 
strong from the beginning of its deployment is far less likely to be tested than one which is 
perceived as initially vulnerable or ineffective”202. Credibility thus contributes to the 
effectiveness of a mission in that a credible mission is less likely to be challenged and can 
thus employ its resources more efficiently.  
 
(F5) Expert Knowledge: Although not directly connected to either the physical or non-
physical properties of the mission per se, this factor represents, in our view, an important 
structural component of UN missions. We are defining “expert knowledge” in terms of the 
existence of a specialized Human Rights Unit or, in a broader sense, of civilian personnel 
actively involved in the prevention of such abuses. The knowledge of how violations can be 
monitored, registered, and effectively countered represents a much needed addition to the use 
of force and is conducive to the re-establishment of the rule of law. We argue that a high level 
of expertise – within the field of human rights and humanitarian law – represents a 
precondition for the successful fulfilment of a UN operation’s “civilian protection” task.  
 
   
202 S/1999/957, §60 (emphasis added).  
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(F6) Homogeneity: Peacekeeping forces can be more or less homogeneous in a number of 
ways: with regard to their language and cultural background, their training and equipment, 
and even their political preferences. We assume that a peacekeeping force is more likely to be 
effective the more homogeneous it is. A common language facilitates communication within 
the force, similar levels of training and equipment make it easier for the commander to know 
what he can expect from his troops, and also make the overall performance of the force more 
predictable etc. In sum, homogeneity contributes to the cohesion of a peacekeeping force and 
may therefore partly explain its effectiveness.  
 
(F7) Salience: This factor refers to the salience of the task to protect civilians in the mandate 
as well as in the operations of a peacekeeping force. The language of the provisions which 
authorize the protection of civilians differ: in some cases, the force may take the necessary 
action to protect civilians, in others it is authorized to contribute to the safety of the civilian 
population, and sometimes it is simply supposed to ensure the protection of civilians203. 
Another indicator for the salience of the protection mandate is the attention which the 
Secretary General devotes to this part of the mandate in his reports to the Security Council. 
Moreover, the extent to which a mission implements measures which are aimed specifically at 
ensuring the protection of civilians is an indicator for the salience of the protection mandate in 
the operations of the mission. It goes without saying that we assume a high salience of the 
protection mandate to contribute to the effectiveness of a mission in protecting civilians.  
 
(F8) Intensity:  One of the external factors playing having a direct effect on the efficiency of 
UN actions is the intensity of the conflict. Intuitively speaking, “intensity” acts as a constraint 
on a mission’s operational capabilities, either straining them up to the point at which they are 
considered inadequate – as was the case with UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire – or, by contrast, 
offering UN personnel the possibility to focus more on peace building processes and 
humanitarian assistance. Ideally, “intensity” should have a negative effect on effectiveness 
with a high level of conflict adversely affecting UN’s potential for protecting civilians. 
 
(F9) Legitimacy: While the legitimacy of UN forces in the local population is primarily a 
function of their success in protecting civilians, it in turn also influences their effectiveness. 
On the on hand, the cooperation and support of the population can significantly enhance the 
peacekeepers’ ability to prevent attacks from occurring, and it is easier to protect civilians 
   
203 Cf. Mansson 2005, p. 514.  
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when they trust the peacekeepers and actively seek their protection. On the other hand, if a 
UN mission is disliked by the local population, this can severely limit the troops’ freedom of 
movement and their capacity to fulfil their tasks: When protests against the United Nations 
erupt, the UN premises have to be protected against looting and destruction, and in a hostile 
atmosphere the peacekeepers have to be cautious not to be injured or even lynched. 
Furthermore, rejection by the local populations almost certainly has a devastating effects on 
the morale of the troops, and consequently, on their commitment.   
 
(F10) Cooperation: In order to assess the influence a certain political environment has on a 
mission’s achievement, we have decided to use “cooperation” as the factor describing the 
willingness of major stakeholders – usually the warring parties – to solve the conflict and to 
cooperate with the UN peacekeeping force to this end. From this perspective, a high level of 
“cooperation” would positively influence UN endeavours in stabilizing the situation and 
releasing civilians from the insecurity of war. As a counter-example, Cote d’Ivoire’s situation 
is representative for “non-cooperation”. The lack of political will in finding a peaceful 
solution to the conflict is obvious from the constant obstructions to the peace process raised 
by high ranking Ivorians. 
 
(F11) Enforcement Mandate: A mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. a mandate 
to use “all necessary means”, including military force to fulfil a the tasks assigned to a 
mission, is not the same as an enforcement mandate. Chapter VII mandates can be given for a 
wide range of tasks. Only when these tasks include the re-establishment of peace in a country, 
e.g. by effectively taking control of the whole territory, does the mission have a peace-
enforcement mandate. 
The following table summarizes all our factors and offers additional explanations for the 
assigned values:  
 
Table 3: Factor Values 
 
 Factors Values Explanation Correlation with Effectiveness 
F1 Size “Yes”  = 1 Adequate Positive 
“No” = 0 Inadequate Negative 
F2 Equipment “Yes” = 1 Adequate Positive 
“No” = 0 Inadequate Negative 
F3 Commitment “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No” = 0 Low Negative 
F4 Credibility “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No” = 0 Low Negative 
F5 Expert Knowledge “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No” = 0 Low Negative 
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F6 Homogeneity “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No”= 0 Low Negative 
F7 Salience “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No”= 0 Low Negative 
F8 
 
Intensity “Yes”= 1 High Negative 
“No”= 0 Low Positive 
F9 
 
Legitimacy “Yes”= 1 High Positive 
“No”= 0 Low Negative 
F10 Cooperation “Yes” = 1 High Positive 
“No” = 0 Low Negative 
F11 Enforcement Mandate  “Yes”=1 - Positive 
“No” = 0 - Negative 
 
 
5.2. Case Studies 
5.2.1. Sierra Leone 
The reason for UNAMSIL’s initial failure does not lay in an inadequate number of troops. At 
the time when the RUF took more than 500 peacekeepers hostage, the mission comprised 
more than 9,000 soldiers. Throughout the following years, UNAMSIL was for most of the 
time deployed in sufficient strength to fulfil its tasks. The assessment mission which 
investigated the May 2000 hostage crisis identified, however, “serious shortfalls in 
equipment”204 as one of the reasons. These problems were mainly due to the quick 
deployment of the mission and were subsequently addressed.  
There were notable changes in commitment between different phases of the mission. The 
hastily deployed troops of UNAMSIL I, which had barely any knowledge about their mandate 
and the rules of engagement, were reportedly demoralized and put up almost no resistance 
when they were disarmed and taken hostage by rebels. The evidence suggests that the 
commitment changed when the force was restructured, better trained and placed under a more 
coherent command. It was also only after this restructuring process that the mission regained 
its credibility. The greater room for manoeuvre of the restructured mission allowed it to 
support the Sierran Leonean Government in the extension of state authority and therefore 
necessitated its transformation into a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation with a strong 
human rights component.  
In the beginning, UNAMSIL was more heterogeneous than is common for UN troops because 
it in part consisted of “re-hatted” ECOMOG troops. This created tensions, especially between 
the Indian force commander and his Nigerian subordinates. In the restructuring process, the 
Indian force commander was replaced; furthermore, the significant imbalances in training and 
equipment were mitigated. During the first year of its deployment, UNAMSIL was largely 
preoccupied with protecting itself; not surprisingly the protection of civilians was only a 
   
204 S/2000/751, §54.  
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secondary concern at this time. Later, however, the plight of civilians in the areas under RUF-
control became one of the key incentives to recover these territories. When UNAMSIL first 
deployed to Sierra Leone, the intensity of the conflict was high, and it remained so until 
UNAMSIL began to successfully embark on peace enforcement. Only UNAMSIL II had a 
peace enforcement mandate. Until the end of the conflict, the RUF only cooperated under 
heavy military pressure. UNAMSIL’s legitimacy grew with its success.  
 
5.2.2. Democratic Republic of Congo 
It is hard to see how the troop level of MONUC could ever have been adequate if maybe 
100,000, but certainly more than 50,000 troops would be necessary to pacify the country, 
which has the size of Western Europe, in the way Sierra Leone was pacified – through 
deployment of troops to all key locations in the country. However, since the deployment of 
MONUC in brigade-size to North and South Kivu and Ituri, the troop strength is adequate to 
fulfil the mission’s tasks in these areas. At least, the strength of the troops deployed 
corresponds to the requests of the Secretary General. The same is true for Operation Artemis. 
Artemis and the three Eastern brigades were/are also adequately equipped and, due to their 
robust military posture, quickly became forces for the rebels to be reckoned with 
(“credibility”). On all these counts, the opposite is the case for MONUC I. For years, the 
mission did not reach its authorized strength and lacked the equipment direly needed 
especially in a country like the DR Congo, which is huge, but has almost no infrastructure. As 
concerns commitment, the hopelessly overstretched MONUC I troops displayed little 
enthusiasm for taking on rebels e.g. in Ituri or Bukavu, although their mandate allowed them 
to do so. On the other hand, the mainly French troops which made up Artemis, as well as the 
Indian and Pakistani brigades deployed in the Kivus  (MONUC II) were much more 
committed to their mission than the soldiers they replaced. The deployment of the Kivu 
brigades also increased the homogeneity of MONUC as they replaced a “patchwork of 
national contingents of varying degrees and enthusiasm”205.  
The more robust approach taken by the Kivu brigades became possible after the Security 
Council had expanded the peace enforcement mandate which it had originally limited to Ituri 
to the rest of the country. Due to the intensity of the conflict which remains relatively high to 
this day, it was only with this mandate and a significant increase in troop strength that 
MONUC felt to be capable to give high priority to the protection of the civilian population. 
However, there remain some constants with earlier years: The mission always had a human 
   
205 Traub 2005.  
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rights component, and the rebels refuse to cooperate to this day. Furthermore, in the first years 
of its deployment MONUC has ruined its reputation so thoroughly, through ineptitude and 
instances of sexual exploitation, that the recent changes seem not to have made much of a 
difference in public attitudes towards the mission.  
 
5.2.3. Liberia 
After applying the analytic framework to our analysis of Liberia’s UN intervention a couple 
of interesting results have emerged. First, the Liberian case can be considered a success story, 
also in view of the country’s October 2005 elections when, after what international observers 
had declared a free and fair process - a woman, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, was elected head of 
state. The improving security situation in Liberia and the ever growing participation of its 
civil society in ongoing deliberations about the country’s reconstruction process is a telling 
proof that UNMIL has been effective in protecting civilians. Second, almost all the factors 
under analysis have been assigned positive values. The UN mission is thus characterized by 
an adequate size, sufficient equipment, high commitment, and credibility. Its human rights 
component (“Expert Knowledge”) is actively engaged in promoting human rights culture and 
legislation. The UN troops are homogeneous – as defined in Section 5.1. – and the salience of 
the “protection of civilians” task within the mission’s mandate is high. Moreover, with respect 
to potential conflicts, the situation is stable, although as yet fragile. The DDR program has 
successfully demobilized ex-combatants and large quantities of weapons have been 
confiscated. Despite ongoing looting, especially in more remote areas of the country, and 
persistent, though small scale street clashes, the intensity of the conflict is low.  The UN is 
perceived as the legitimate actor in the implementation of the peace process (high 
“Legitimacy”) and the reconstruction of Liberia’s democratic institutions. Cooperation from 
major political figures, though tentative at first, has positively evolved over the last year. In 
conclusion, we can safely say that UNMIL is actively fulfilling its peacekeeping mandate (not 
“enforcement mandate” though) and that the protection of civilians has figured high on the 
agenda from the first moment of the mission’s deployment.  
 
5.2.4. Côte d’Ivoire 
Despite strenuous international attempts at solving the Ivorian conflict, the situation seems 
still far from improving. The rising tension and the ongoing violent clashes between President 
Gbagbo’s supporters and the Forces Nouvelles rebels have severely strained UNOCI’s 
capacity to protect non-combatants. In the light of its “ineffective” assessment, the values 
allotted to the different factors help in drawing a rather mixed picture of both the mission’s 
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achievements and the conflict’s intrinsic features. First, as an overall observation, the values – 
by comparison to the UNMIL case – tend to be rather negative. “Size”, “Equipment”, 
“Credibility”, and “Cooperation” are all assigned a “0” evaluation. This means that the 
mission does not have the necessary resources to fulfill its mandate, it is understaffed, lacks 
adequate equipment and consequently, its credibility is low. Moreover, despite the low 
intensity of conflict due to the zone of confidence separating the two sides, UNOCIs 
ineffectiveness in protecting civilians is aggravated by the non-cooperation of the warring 
parties. President Gbagbo for example is known to be the advocate of a so-called “military 
solution”, that is the elimination of northern rebels by force. From this perspective, his 
commitment to UN peace initiatives does appear rather questionable. With a “peacekeeping 
mandate” which does not spell out any clear provisions for the adoption of a proactive stance, 
the UN operation in Cote d’Ivoire is trapped in a system which has adjusted to war and – due 
to its profitability for almost all the main contenders – finds little incentive in promoting 
peace. 
 
5.2.5. Burundi 
As we already pointed out, ONUB’s role in protecting civilians has been very limited due to 
the stable security situation and the country’s effective army. With this in mind, it is safe to 
say that ONUB’s size and equipment have been adequate for its tasks. There is no evidence 
which would suggest that the ONUB troops have not been committed to their mission. 
However, due to its limited role, it would be hard ascribe to ONUB any credibility as an 
autonomous military actor. At least as important for the protection of civilians as its military 
assistance has been the human rights component, which has been monitoring the treatment of 
civilians by the parties to the conflict. This has been facilitated by the good cooperation of the 
Burundian Government and the Army. Consisting of a “re-hatted” African Union mission 
which was supplemented with troops from Pakistan and Nepal, ONUB has not been a 
homogeneous mission. Although it has mainly indirectly contributed to the protection of 
civilians (“low salience”), there have been no incidents which would indicate that the 
population disapproves of the mission in any way. As peace was already established when 
ONUB arrived, there was obviously no need for an enforcement mandate. 
 
5.3. Summary 
The empirical results we have gathered so far are summarized below in a Table 9. Overall, we 
have differentiated our empirical cases into “effective” missions: ONUB, ARTEMIS, 
MONUC II, UNMIL, and UNAMSIL II and “ineffective” ones: UNAMSIL I, UNOCI, and 
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MONUC I. A first look at the table shows no striking correlation between one condition in 
particular and its respective outcome. The patterns are “hidden” in the information, and in 
order to disengage the valid configurations – which would help us explain these outcomes – 
we need to apply a formalized procedure for reducing the quantity of information and 
bringing forward cross-case regularities206. We proceed in two steps: (1) a simplifying 
procedure is applied to these results: homogeneous rows are merged and all the varying 
factors will be eliminated; (2) the final results are presented in a final table (Table 10), under 
the form of two configurations explaining the outcome “effectiveness”. 
 
Table 9: “Truth Table” 
 
 
Nr. Factor(s) Cases 
Sierra 
Leone 
Côte  
d’Ivoire 
Congo Burundi 
 
Congo Congo 
 
Liberia 
 
Sierra 
Leone  
UNAMSIL1 
1999/01 
UNOCI 
2004/05 
MONUC1 
2000/04  
ONUB 
2004/05 
ARTEMIS 
2003/04 
MONUC2 
2004/05 
UNMIL 
2003/05 
UNAMSIL2 
2001/05 
F1 Size 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
F2 Equipment  0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
F3 Commitment  0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
F4 Credibility  0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
F5 Expert 
Knowledge 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F6 Homogeneity 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  
F7 Salience  0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
F8 Intensity 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
F9 Legitimacy 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
F10 Cooperation 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
F11 Enforcement 
Mandate 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
 Effectiveness 
(Eff./Ineff.) 
Ineff. Ineff. Ineff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. Eff. 
 
 
Simplification of Rows: Results for “Effectiveness”  
This standardization yields some interesting regularities. However, the results are still rather 
mixed and more simplification is needed, an operation which is performed in the next step. In 
Table 10, the conditions (factors) associated with the outcome under analysis have been 
standardized so as to show: the presence (uppercase style) and absence (lowercase style) of a 
condition with “x” symbolizing the combination of factors. “SIZE” in this case means that the 
condition has received a value of “1” in Table 9, i.e. the attribute “adequate size” can be 
identified in the respective mission. By contrast, “homogeneity” (UNAMSIL II) which has 
the value of “0” shows that UNAMSIL II is characterized by a low homogeneity of troops. 
The simplifying of rows refers to an operation which eliminates the variation of factors and 
   
206 The methodology we are applying in this section relies extensively on Charles Ragin’s description of 
comparative research. See Ragin 1994, p. 120.  
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focuses instead on constants. This means that we need first to identify the rows which are 
homogenous in terms of their conditions’ values. A quick glance at Table 9 shows that we 
have two such potential mergers: Rows 1, 3, and 4 are quite similar on most of their variables, 
with the exception of “homogeneity” and “legitimacy”. The first one – “homogeneity”— is 
negative in R1 and positive in both R3 and R4. The second condition – “legitimacy” – is 
negative in R3 and positive in the other two. By merging the rows207 – in a procedure 
equalling the subsuming of R1 + R3 + R4 – we eliminate the variation of “homogeneity” and 
“legitimacy” and, instead, we are left with our first explanatory configuration for the outcome 
“effectiveness”. The same procedure is applied in the case of rows 2 and 5. The results are 
presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Simplified Configurations 
 
Rows Configurations 
R1 + R3 + R4  
 
SIZE x EQUIP x COMMIT x CRED x EK x SAL. x INT x coop x MANDATE 
R2 + R5 SIZE x EQUIP x COMMIT x EK x int x LEG x COOP x mandate 
 
 
Conclusion 
What do these configurations tell us? Obviously we have to distinguish between two different 
conflict patterns which necessitate that specific factors be present in order for a peacekeeping 
mission to be effective in protecting civilians. There are four factors which are in any case 
essential for the success of the mission: adequate troop strength, adequate equipment, high 
commitment on the part of the troops and “expert knowledge”, e.g. a human rights 
component. The other factors vary across different conflict patterns:  
 
(1) High-intensity conflict with non-cooperation by the parties.  
In a high-intensity conflict in which some or all of the parties refuse to cooperate with the UN 
mission, the peacekeeping force can only succeed in protecting civilians if the following 
additional conditions are met:  
• The mission must have a peace-enforcement mandate. It has to be authorized to use 
force not only to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence, but also 
to enforce peace more broadly, e.g. by expanding its control over territory, taking on 
armed elements which resist the mission’s deployment etc..  
   
207 Ragin mentions that only two rows are usually merged at once (1994: 123). Given the similarity of the three 
rows we have decided to avoid a two-step procedure and to push this merger at the same time. 
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• The mission must be militarily credible. It must not only have an adequate size, 
adequate equipment and commitment, but must also project its military strength in 
order to enforce respect and deter potential challengers. A robust military posture is 
also a precondition for a mission to fulfil its enforcement mandate. 
• The mission must give high salience to the protection of civilians. Even a militarily 
credible peacekeeping force with an enforcement mandate may fail to protect civilians 
if it does not give priority to this particular task.  
 
(2) Low-intensity conflict with cooperation by the parties  
In a low-intensity conflict in which the parties cooperate with the UN mission, the 
peacekeeping force can succeed in protecting civilians without a peace-enforcement mandate, 
without military credibility and without giving particular salience to the task. Only one 
additional condition must be met for the mission to effectively protect civilians:  
• The mission must enjoy legitimacy in the local population. As the legitimacy of a 
peacekeeping force is not only a precondition for the mission’s success, but can also 
be the result of the mission’s effectiveness in protecting civilians, there is a possibility 
for the emergence of a virtuous circle between effectiveness and legitimacy.  
 
How can these configurations be put to use for explaining the effectiveness of the UN 
peacekeeping missions discussed in the case studies? It is easy to explain the failure of 
UNAMSIL I, UNOCI and MONUC I in protecting the civilian population on the basis of the 
configurations. None of these peacekeeping missions even met all of the four basic criteria – 
adequate size and equipment, commitment and human rights expertise – which have to be 
present in any case for a mission to effectively protect civilians. The success of Artemis, 
MONUC II and UNAMSIL II even under conditions of a high-intensity conflict and without 
the cooperation of the parties is explained, in addition to the indispensable factors, by their 
enforcement mandate, their military credibility and the importance they attributed to the task 
of civilian protection. Interestingly, neither their legitimacy in the eyes of the population nor 
the homogeneity of their forces have been decisive. According to the configurations, the 
success of UNMIL and ONUB can be attributed to the cooperation of the parties, the low 
intensity of the conflicts in which they operated, as well as their legitimacy in the population. 
Neither the salience of civilian protection in their activities nor their military credibility has 
played a decisive role in their effectiveness.  
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6. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to assess and explain the effectiveness of UN Forces in protecting 
civilians. The protection of civilians, if necessary with the help of military force, is a 
relatively new task in the ever-increasing repertoire of functions which UN peacekeeping 
missions have come to assume, especially since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, 
for civilians caught in the devastating dynamics of the “new wars”, physical protection is 
doubtlessly the most important and immediate concern. The novelty and salience of the 
protection of civilians by international forces justify the highest level of academic attention.  
Since so far no comprehensive study on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping forces in the 
protection of civilians by UN peacekeeping forces has been undertaken208, this paper 
represents pioneering work. We have approached the topic in two steps. Firstly, we have 
created “thick descriptions” of the performance of all peacekeeping missions which had or 
have the mandate to use all necessary means in order to protect civilians. We then assessed 
their effectiveness in fulfilling this task based on a previously specified standard. Secondly, 
we have identified factors which we believed could be part of an explanation of the 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions in our empirical cases. We then used a 
comparative method to arrive at constellations of factors which explain why some missions 
have failed, and others have succeeded in protecting civilians.  
Of course, our interest in explaining the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions is not purely 
academic. The incredible plight which civilians continue to endure in armed conflicts makes 
the improvement of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations an immediately 
practical concern. Our findings do have practical implications beyond the hardly surprising 
discovery of the necessity for adequate troop strength and equipment. Especially the 
preconditions for effective civilian protection in high-intensity conflicts with non-cooperative 
parties, which we have identified, deserve closer consideration. Apparently, a Chapter VII 
mandate which is limited to the protection of civilians under immediate threat of physical 
danger is insufficient in such conflicts. Only the more comprehensive use of military force 
which a peace-enforcement mandate allows for effective protection of civilians in these 
contexts, as the example of Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo show. We 
can only hope that the Security Council considers these experiences when it decides on a 
mandate for a United Nations peacekeeping mission for Darfur within the coming weeks.  
We are perfectly aware of the limitations of our approach. The small number of cases make 
generalizations very difficult. Furthermore, the dynamics of armed conflicts, especially in 
   
208 See Mansson 2005, p. 516: “No study has been undertaken as to when and how recourse to use of force for 
the protection of civilians has been implemented and successful.” 
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failing states, as well as the workings of peacekeeping operations are influenced by a complex 
interplay of often unique political, military, historical, social and geographical circumstances 
which can hardly be captured by eleven rather broadly defined factors. We therefore see this 
paper as not more than a first step to a better understanding of how the international 
community, acting through the United Nations, can live up to the promise to assume its 
responsibility to protect.  
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